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ABSTRACT
The traditional deterrence-based paradigm of civil liability may
be understood as indirect market regulation, as the risk of incurring
liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety. Such
an approach, however, has proven to be inappropriate in medical
civil liability. Extensive literature shows that the increase in the
asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical civil liability beyond a certain limit does not improve safety; instead, that
strategy determines the adoption of “defensive” techniques (the so* Associate Professor of Commercial Law, Giustino Fortunato University
of Benevento (Italy).
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called “defensive medicine”). Paradoxically, this approach leads to
a reduction in market efficiency and overall patient safety.
The traditional paradigm of medical civil liability, moreover, is
very likely to prevent the intensive use of artificial intelligence and
robotization to further develop the healthcare landscape. In fact,
under the current paradigm of civil liability, redress is allowed only
insofar “somebody” is identified as liable to pay damages (either
because of fault or based on strict liability). However, robots and
software may “behave” far independently from instructions initially
provided by designers and programmers. This possibility may represent a disincentive to new AI technologies, as in this model designers and programmers could be held liable even if the damage
derives from the “correct” operation of algorithms and robots.
This article proposes that the law of redress in healthcare should
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management
of losses. No-fault redress schemes could be an interesting and valuable regulatory strategy in order to allow such an evolution. Also,
some pieces of “no fault” legislation are discussed, and a few proposals and comments are provided.
Keywords: healthcare, medical malpractice, civil liability, “nofault,” strict liability, guidelines, artificial intelligence, robots
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Civil liability may be considered, under a functional point of
view, as a technique of indirect market regulation, since the risk to
incur liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety. 1
The idea is that any raise of the stick of civil liability for a given
activity would determine a corresponding increase of efforts, by
firms and professionals operating in the relevant market, aimed at
reducing the risk or compensation until the point where, roughly

1. On the different “functions” of civil liability, among others, see H.
Koziol, Comparative conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 746 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015).
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speaking, any further investment in safety would cost more than the
risk to pay redress to damaged clients and users.
The above technique of indirect market regulation may work
only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allocated onto the
same subject called to invest further resources in safety. Therefore,
such a paradigm 2 of civil liability invariably requires identification
of a person liable for redress, which is likely to be the producer of a
given product of the provider of a given service. 3
This deterrence-based approach works in several scenarios (e.g.,
damages for defective products), but is inappropriate in others, such
as healthcare, where increased liability may lead, and has actually
lead, to “defensive medicine” strategies (i.e., practices that are not
in the interest of patients, aimed at protecting doctors against potential plaintiffs), 4 which have proven to be harmful for the whole system and also for patients themselves. 5
It seems, therefore, necessary to unwind the increase of civil liability against doctors and hospitals in order to guarantee that
healthcare systems may develop a more efficient and safer approach.
2. A paradigm is the conceptual tool defining methods and problems and
solving problems accepted by a given community: see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (U. Chicago Press 1962). Paradigms influence interpretation in two ways. First, they allow one to detect objects and relationships
that each paradigm allows to detect, but they prevent detection of objects and
relationships incompatible or “hidden” to it (id. at 151). Paradigms, in other
words, provide schemes with which is it possible to “order” the world (id. at 44),
so that without such schemes there would be only a “great blooming, buzzing
confusion” (id. at 141, quoting William James). Second, and consequently, the
paradigm accepted in each moment represents the conceptual tool with which one
defines problems that are considered solvable and the relevant solution methods.
See id. at 58 and 138, where reference is made to “normative” functions of paradigms.
3. See infra §§ II and III.
4. “Defensive medicine occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily
solely) because of concern about malpractice liability.” U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (Government Printing Office 1994).
For the sake of completeness, one should note that some authors contest the relevance of defensive medicine in this field; see, e.g., M. J. Saks & S. Landsman,
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine, 30 HEALTH MATRIX 25.
5. See infra § IV.
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This is especially so because the negative consequences brought by
defensive medicine are particularly harsh, both in terms of costs for
national communities and of the increase in other negative externalities.
This complex situation does not allow for simple solutions but
requires a well-designed action to allow public healthcare to remain
in place the way we know it. The claim in this paper is that the problem of defensive medicine could be much reduced by introducing
an alternative compensation system for damage caused by medical
treatments.
This claim, calling for an evolution towards an alternative paradigm, may also be extended to artificial intelligence markets, as they
are likely to be prone to similar negative externalities when civil liability is applied as a regulatory strategy based on deterrence.
In this article, I propose that “no-fault” systems, existing in
many countries, may provide direction for a future reform. The concept of “no fault” is used here with reference to a system where redress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the
agent being established; it does not make reference, instead, to strictliability schemes that likewise ignore “fault” as a condition to impose liability but operate in the opposite direction, by imposing the
obligation to redress on agents regardless of their culpability.
I also recall peculiarities and weaknesses of such schemes, in
order to demarcate the scope of their usability as models for reform.
As evidenced in the title, this article is aimed at representing as a
call toward the setting of a research agenda on the issue, rather than
having the ambition of providing fully worked-out answers. These
may be a long way ahead, but I believe that a clear statement of the
pitfalls of current legislation and the scope of its future reformation
represent a sound step in that direction.
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II. THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON
DETERRENCE
The current paradigm of civil liability laws is mainly based on
the assumption that civil liability plays and should play an important
role in deterrence. It is thought that any increase of liability on producers and suppliers of goods and services will increase investments
in safety, aimed at preventing liability. The belief is that the tougher
civil liability rules on producers and other professionals, the higher
the overall level of safety within the system. 6
As noted above, such technique of indirect market regulation
may work only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allocated to the same subject called to invest further resources in safety.
This may be done via fault-based liability or strict liability. The first
one is rooted in fault and requires an “offender,” i.e., a person found
responsible for a given damage and therefore liable to redress it.
In fact, the idea that civil liability requires somebody’s “fault” is
deeply rooted in legal thinking: it emerged in Justinian law and was
further consolidated in the jus commune and canon law, 7 beginning
approximately one thousand and five hundred years ago. This idea,
inspiring the whole system of civil liability as a paradigmatic principle, was called, in German literature, the “dogma of fault”
(Verschuldensdogma). This approach is represented by the wellknown expression “Nicht der Shaden verpflichtet zum Schadensersatz, sondern die Schuld” (the obligation to pay compensation derives from fault, not from damage), formulated by von Jhering. 8
6. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Yale U. Press 1970); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 336338 (6th ed., Pearson/Addison Wesley 2008); J. Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135 (2014). More recently, see Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2011).
7. Among others, see H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, 1 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 422
(5th ed., Éditions Montchrestien 1957).
8. R. VON JHERING, DAS SHULDMOMENT IM RÖMISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 40
(Brühl 1867).
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A. Evolution Toward a “Solidarity Approach”
The paradigmatic centrality of “deterrence” evolved over time
but remained in place when most relevant social, political and economic changes made legal thinking advance toward an increasing
quest for solidarity in all western legal systems, regardless of their
civil-law or common-law basic structure 9—though the common law
is traditionally less concerned with solidarity in private relationships
than the civil law is.
The quest for solidarity, greatly prompted by the factual consequences and upheavals derived from the industrial revolution, made
legislators to consider it unjust that damages following certain (intrinsically risky) activities should be borne by consumers and other
end users of goods and services unless “fault” by producers or other
professionals could be proven in court.
Such evolution brought a relevant variation in civil liability legislations (within the same paradigm, I believe), which lead to an
“asymmetric” discipline of civil liability and to the adoption of lossspreading strategies for civil liability laws. 10 Under such development, which evolved throughout the whole 20th century, legislators
reallocated the cost of accidents from customers and end users to
producers and other professionals, since the latter were thought to
be in a better position to spread the cost of accidents and arrange for
appropriate prevention policies.

9. In Italy see, e.g., A. DE CUPIS, IL DANNO: TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE 66 (Giuffrè 1979); in France, see L. Josserand, Les transports, in XVIII TRAITÉ GÉNÉRAL THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL
457 (Edmond-Eugéne Thaller ed. 1910); in Germany, see H. SPERL, ÜBER DAS
SCHADENERSATZRECHT NACH DEM DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE
154 (Manz Verlag 1902); in England, see M. LUNNEY & K. OLIPHANT, TORT LAW
TEXT AND MATERIALS 15 (Oxford U. Press 2000). For a more general and comparative perspective, see S. TAYLOR, DIFFERING CULTURES OF CIVIL LIABILITY
IN MEDICAL ACCIDENT LIABILITY AND REDRESS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(Cambridge U. Press 2015).
10. M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Morano 1965). For an economic point of view, see R. D. COOTER, Economic Theories
of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11-30 (1991).
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In other words, liability became less dependent on the fault that
caused the damage and was more and more dependent upon the risky
nature of some activities (among which one should especially note
industrial production).
This need to reallocate the cost of accidents to producers and
other professionals widened the potential of deterrence raised by
civil liability law. The borders of civil liability were extended beyond the cases where plaintiffs could establish “fault” by the producer or professional, i.e., to all those cases where producers and
professionals could not show that the damage was not attributable
to them, cases in which there was scientific uncertainty as to the
cause of the harmful effects or even where such cause was unknown. 11
This evolution was pursued through similar techniques in different western legal systems, mainly the reversal of the burden of proof
and the imposition of strict liability on producers and other professionals, the development of the precautionary principle in many
fields of application, etc.
In medical civil liability, this path included sector-specific evolutions, such as the imposition of an obligation of result with respect
to many therapies and especially routine ones (in English law
through the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, 12 in Germany through the Anscheinsbeweis or prima facie Beweis doctrine, 13 etc.). Some jurisdictions even turned extra-contractual medical liability into contractual liability (which favors patients, inter alia, as regards the burden
of proof) following the German doctrine of faktische

11. R. MONTINARO, DUBBIO SCIENTIFICO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Giuffrè
2012); for an economic analysis of law perspective, see M. G. Faure, L. T.
Visscher, F. Weber, Liability for Unknown Risk – A Law and Economics Perspective, 7 J. EUR. TORT LAW 198-228 (2016).
12. See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
13. M. STAUCH, THE LAW OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 73 (Hart Publ’g 2008).
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Vertragsverhältnisse, 14 as it happened in Italy with the theory of
contatto sociale. 15
As briefly noted above, this evolution, even if relevant and
somehow innovative, represented mere incremental advancement of
the same traditional paradigm based on deterrence. In fact, the development just summarized was limited, basically, only to reallocate
the “cost of accidents” from customers and users to producers and
professionals (in healthcare, from patients to doctors and hospitals)
within the same conceptual and legal framework already in place
(including the deterrence function).
What changed, in other terms, was the balancing of interests, not
rethinking techniques to satisfy them, insofar as the concept of deterrence was widened. In some cases that widening was toward strict
liability, simply in order to widen its potential also to cases where
fault could not be positively assessed in court, with the aim of inducing producers and other professionals to increase investments in
safety accordingly. 16
The same (mere) incremental evolution may be observed in the
adoption of loss-spreading techniques, such as the provision of mandatory insurance for producers and professionals. In fact, mandatory
insurance is mainly thought to protect damaged consumers and other
end users of goods and services from the risk that producers or other
professionals have insufficient patrimony to pay redress.
It is certainly true that the development of insurance is based on
a solidarity model, aimed at spreading losses among all insured producers and professionals, and it is likewise true that in markets
where mandatory insurance is provided the deterrence element is diluted by insurance itself, insofar as the extra cost of negligence is
14. G. Haupt, Über faktische Vertragsverhältnisse, 124 LEIPZIGER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN (1943).
15. Cass. Jan. 22, 1999, No. 589; on this issue, see C. Castronovo, Obblighi
di protezione, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA (Treccani 1990).
16. R. SAVATIER, 1 TRAITÉ DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EN DROIT FRANÇAIS CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIF, PROFESSIONNEL, PROCÉDURAL 3 (2d ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1945); M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Morano 1965).

2020]

MEDICAL CIVIL LIABILITY

95

marginally distributed amongst all the insured. However, the mere
existence of insurance coverage may not necessarily modify the traditional paradigm of civil liability based on deterrence. In fact, insurance determines a reallocation of the obligation to pay compensation, but producers and other professionals may remain liable for
damages in case insurance coverage is not applicable (e.g., when the
event is not covered by the contract or in case of willful misconduct
or, often, even gross negligence). In any case, they remain subject
to deterrence at least indirectly, since after paying compensation insurers would shift to the relevant producers and professionals the
cost of any redress paid on their behalf by applying higher insurance
premiums. 17
B. The Remaining Centrality of the “Traditional” Paradigm
The above-mentioned paradigm may be considered indisputable
in legislation, where civil liability is invariably considered also for
its potential of deterrence and, therefore, the increase of civil liability is considered as a regulatory technique to foster investments in
safety by producers and professionals. Also in law-and-economics
literature, the paradigm is very rarely contested: it is sometimes disputed if civil liability rules should be imposed in some sectors to
enhance safety instead of ex ante regulation and when such rules
could be capable of producing appropriate incentives. However, it
is assumed that civil liability plays an indirect-regulation role, insofar as the cost of compensating harmed customers and end users
(whether or not it is spread out to the entire sector by insurance)
represents an incentive of producers and other professionals to invest in safer products and services.
17. The relationship between insurance coverage and deterrence is discussed
by G. Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK
AND INS.—ISSUES AND PRACTICE 277 (2006); H. Luntz, Torts and Insurance: The
Effect on Deterrence (conference paper) (Dec. 2010), available at
https://perma.cc/GH6A-2JG9; S. Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.—ISSUES AND
PRACTICE 166 (2000).
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This consensus on the traditional paradigm prevails even when
civil liability rules are approached critically, for instance, by authors
reconsidering the efficiency of civil liability rules in preventing
safety risks. In pursuing such strategies, however, they seem to suggest a preference for ex ante regulation with reference to some markets. 18 Occasionally, the literature points out that the incentives produced on safety by civil liability rules may be inappropriate in some
markets. However, critics tend to focus on the context in which such
rules are applied rather than on the rules and their design. 19
It is not common, in fact, that steps are taken to rethink and redesign the concept of civil liability; most of the times, the latter
keeps being considered, as such, invariably designed as a deterrence
instrument (even if sometimes not appropriate) having a direct positive impact on safety.
Even sophisticated studies at the supranational level have considered, and still consider, civil liability as performing the central
function of deterrence along with that of compensation. 20 A similar
approach is to be found in the Principles of European Tort Law
(PETL) drafted by the European Group on Tort Law, 21 especially as
regards linking redress to someone’s liability to compensate damage
(art. 1:101(1)) and to liability based either on fault or “strict liability” (Title III). This comes as no surprise, since the Principles represent a summary of existing European laws, in which the deterrence-based paradigm is certainly in place.

18. See, e.g., M. G. Faure, The Complementary Roles of Liability, Regulation
and Insurance in Safety Management: Theory and Practice, J. RISK RES. (2014);
M. G. Faure, Private Liability and Critical Infrastructure, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG.
229-243 (2015).
19. See, e.g., Rebecca K. Viscusi, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?,
35 REGULATION 24-31 (2012).
20. OECD, Medical Malpractice. Prevention, Insurance and Coverage Options, 11 POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE 27 (2006).
21. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Springer 2005).
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III. THE “BREACH” OF THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM IN
HEALTHCARE AND DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
The deterrence paradigm proves to be reliable and appropriate
in several instances, e.g., with reference to general consumer legislation such as Council Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, imposing strict liability on producers for damage caused by
defective products. 22
The paradigm, however, proves inappropriate in other cases,
such as healthcare. A rich and valuable literature shows that the increase in the asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical
civil liability beyond a certain limit does not improve safety 23 but,
instead, determines the adoption of “defensive” strategies (the socalled “defensive medicine”) and brings about a number of negative
externalities that are listed below.
A significant externality is that costs related to defensive medicine account for a relevant percentage of the overall cost incurred
with respect to national health systems. Preliminarily, one should
note that health expenditure binds a relevant part of the GDP
22. The liability for defective products clearly shows how the function of deterrence is implemented, in civil law systems, pursuant the idea of “solidarity,” as
evidenced above. One may think, in this respect, of the very inspiration of Directive 85/374/EEC, insofar as liability without fault on the part of the producer
(established under art. 1) was thought to be “the sole means of adequately solving
the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment
of the risks inherent in modern technological production.” The deterrence function is evidenced in different passages of that directive, e.g., art. 6, which provides
that “a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect,” taking into account all relevant circumstances.
On this issue it is possible to read, among others, the five reports on the
application of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products
(1995, 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2018), available at https://perma.cc/P8EP-AQZS.
23. OECD, supra note 20, at 16; M. Catino, Blame Culture and Defensive
Medicine, 11 COGNITION, TECH. & WORK 245-253; M. Catino & S. Celotti, The
Problem of Defensive Medicine: Two Italian Surveys, in DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS 206 (R. Beuscart, W. Hackl & C. Nøhr eds., IOS
Press 2009); M. Catino, Why do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? The SideEffects of Medical Litigation, 15 SAFETY SCIENCE MONITOR 1 (2011).
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throughout the world and is currently moving upward. Limiting attention to the last years, the world average expenditure in healthcare
grew, from 2000 to 2017, from 8.622% to 9.896% of the GDP. In
the euro area the increase moved from 8.640% to 10.135%; in the
U.S., from 12.503% to 17.061%. 24
It is not possible to provide any accurate estimate of how much
such an expense is due to defensive medicine; however, available
data show that the latter amounts to a rather high percentage thereof.
As an example, one may consider that a study, conducted by authors
from Harvard University and the University of Melbourne and published in 2010, concluded that more than 80% of the overall annual
USA medical liability system costs (estimated to be $55.6 billion in
2008 dollars, or 2.4% of total healthcare spending), i.e., $45.6 billion, were due to defensive medicine. 25 As regards Italy, in 20142015 defensive medicine was estimated to cost roundly 10 billion
euros a year (i.e., 10.5% of the GDP) and to represent the first category of healthcare waste (26% of the total). 26 One may also add the
following:
− over-prescription of exams, therapies, and medicines that
causes an increase of iatrogenic risks and damage;
− some inefficiencies and loss of quality of the healthcare system;
− abandonment of the sector by insurers and an overall increase of insurance premiums;
24. World Bank, Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK
OPEN DATA, available at https://perma.cc/467C-Z5CM.
25. M. M. Mello, A. Chandra, A. A. Gawande & D. M. Studdert, National
Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1569 (2010). It ought
to be noted that such a number did not “attempt to estimate social costs or benefits
of the malpractice system, such as damage to physicians’ reputations or any deterrent effect it may provide.”
26. V. Di Gregorio, A. M. Ferriero, M. L. Specchia, S. Capizzi, G. Damiani
& W. Ricciardi, Defensive Medicine in Europe: Which Solutions?, 25 EUR. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 145. This study also highlighted that in Europe litigation for medical malpractice increased significantly over the last decade, ranging from more
than 50% in Britain, Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and Eastern Europe to
more than 200–500% in Germany, Italy, the Iberian and Mediterranean Area
countries.
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− abandonment of risky specialities by doctors, hospitals and
universities;
− the refusal to provide treatment in particularly serious cases.
What is most relevant is that, in some sectors such as healthcare,
beyond certain limits the current paradigm of civil liability based on
deterrence is completely unreliable, since further increases of civil
liability do not procure any gain in safety and, to the contrary and
paradoxically, lead to a reduction of market efficiency and overall
patient safety.
A. Defensive Medicine as an Obstacle Toward Safer Healthcare
Risk Management
Moreover, the deterrence paradigm, as it is currently understood
and applied in most western jurisdictions, produces perverse effects
capable of preventing, or at least hindering, the development of
well-grounded risk-management systems.
In fact, several civil liability systems, inspired by the traditional
paradigm, provide doctors with a disincentive to share information
on risks, harmful events, and latent errors and failures. They are required to define evidence-based safety standards and, therefore, develop reliable guidelines, 27 since this may increase their risk of being held liable. As an example, a research carried out in 2006-2007
on approximately one thousand doctors in eighteen Italian hospitals
showed a shocking result: the great majority of doctors considered
reporting and learning systems very useful for their profession, but
less than half of them made any contributions of relevant information fearing legal consequences. 28 Italian legislation on this issue
changed in 2017 in light of this problem, even if it is not clear
27. J. REASON, HUMAN ERROR (Cambridge U. Press 1990); C. Bayley, What
Medical Errors can Tell us About Management Mistakes, in MANAGEMENT MISTAKES IN HEALTHCARE: IDENTIFICATION, CORRECTION AND PREVENTION 74-83
(P. B. Hofmann & F. Perry eds., Cambridge U. Press 2019).
28. See S. Albolino, R. Tartaglia, T. Bellandi, A. M. V. Amicosante, E.
Bianchini & A. Biggeri, Patient Safety and Incident Reporting: Survey of Italian
Healthcare Workers, 19 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (2010).
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whether the solution proposed is capable of resolving it completely. 29
In addition, it is undisputable that evidence-based medicine
(EBM 30) nowadays allows the development of more accurate and
reliable guidelines whose application is capable of reducing the
overall risk of death and damage. 31 However, the current civil liability rules provide doctors with a disincentive to apply them consistently, since their observance may not be sufficient to relieve
them from civil liability 32: the problem seems rather well spread in
29. It ought to be noted that civil liability law was reformed, in Italy, through
Law No. 24 of March 8, 2017. As regards the issue at stake, art. 16 provides that
reports and documents resulting from clinical risk management cannot be acquired or used in the context of legal proceedings. Even if this rule appears to take
into consideration the problem discussed above, in the text, it still leaves two
problems open. First of all, it is possible that such information could be published
in the semi-annual report provided by art. 1, co. 539, let. d bis, Law No. 208 of
December 28, 2015 on adverse events occurred within the facility, the causes that
produced the adverse event, and the resulting initiatives put in place. Secondly, it
is not clear whether such information could be obtained by the Ombudsman under
art. 2 of Law 24/2017. On this issue, see E. Marchisio, Evoluzione della responsabilità civile medica e medicina “difensiva,” 1 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE
212 (2020); L. M. Franciosi, The New Italian Regime for Healthcare Liability and
the Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines: A Dialogue Among Legal Formants, 11
J. CIV. L. STUD. 371 (2018).
30. G. H. Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP J CLUB A-16 (1991);
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New
Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420-25; D. L. Sackett, W. M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. M. Gray et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: What it
is and What it Isn’t, 312 BMJ 71-72.
31. See, e.g., S. A. R. DOI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE IN HEALTH CARE: USING CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); J. H. HOWICK, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Wiley-Blackwell 2011).
32. There is much research on the issue of medical guidelines and on the impact, they have, or should have, on civil liability. On these issues in Italy, see, e.g.,
C. M. MASIERI, LINEE GUIDA E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE DEL MEDICO (Giuffrè
Francis Lefebvre 2019); Simone Calvigioni, Linee guida e buone pratiche clinicoassistenziali, in I PROFILI PROCESSUALI DELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA SULLA RESPONSABILITÀ SANITARIA 216 (A. D. De SANTIS ed., RomaTrE-Press 2017); M. FRANZONI, Colpa e linee guida nella nuova legge, 22 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 278
(2017); C. Scognamiglio, Regole di condotta, modelli di responsabilità e risarcimento del danno nella nuova legge sulla responsabilità sanitaria, 34 CORRIERE
GIURIDICO 740 (2017). Comparative remarks are developed in SIMON TAYLOR,
MEDICAL ACCIDENT LIABILITY AND REDRESS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(Cambridge U. Press 2015). At the European level, see HERMAN NYS, REPORT ON
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL SITUATION IN MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2005), available at https://perma.cc/6ZWP-UUJG; PERSONAL
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different jurisdictions, regardless of their belonging to either civil
law or common law traditions. 33
Interestingly, in other areas of scholarship, such problems are
studied in depth and scholars reached the conclusion that risky activities incorporate a certain percentage of risk depending not on the
person performing them but on the activities themselves. 34 Errors
happen and will happen regardless of how severe civil liability is.
There is, therefore, no point in increasing it beyond the limit where
all actors in the relevant market are disadvantaged.
This situation is not going toward market self-correction. Instead, the market is reacting by adjusting to the perverse incentives
provided by the law, so that “medicine of jurisprudential obedience” 35 is nowadays induced from doctors’ very university
INJURY AND DAMAGE ASCERTAINMENT UNDER CIVIL LAW 537 (S. D. Ferrara, R.
Boscolo-Berto & G. Viel eds., Springer 2016); S. D. Ferrara, E. Baccino, T. Bajanowski, R. Boscolo-Berto, M. Castellano, R. De Angel, A. Pauliukevičius, P.
Ricci, P. Vanezis, D. Nuno Vieira, G. Viel & E. Villanueva, Malpractice and
Medical Liability: European Guidelines on Methods of Ascertainment and Criteria of Evaluation, 127 INTL. J. LEG. MED. 545-557.
33. In regard to the United States, see, e.g., L. L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. OF ONCOLOGY PRACTICE 254 (2007). In the U.K., see S. Ash, S. Jo & M. Gunn, Legal Considerations
of Clinical Guidelines: Will NICE Make a Difference?, 96 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED.
133-138 (2003). In connection with French law, see III THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MEDICAL LIABILITY 76 (Ewoud Hondius ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010). Under
Italian law, see art. 7(3) of Law No. 24 of March 8, 2017, which expressly provides that respect for guidelines and best practices can be considered by the judge
only with respect to the definition of redress and not when assessing civil liability
in the first place.
34. On this point, see the “Swiss cheese model” developed in J. Reason, The
Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the Breakdown of Complex Systems,
327 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON B, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 475-484 (1990). Also see T. Aven, Risk Assessment and Risk
Management: Review of Recent Advances on their Foundation, 253 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 1-13 (2016); J. Aldred, Justifying Precautionary Policies:
Incommensurability and Uncertainty, 96 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 132-140
(2013); T. Aven, The Risk Concept—Historical and Recent Development Trends,
99 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND SYSTEM SAFETY 33-44 (2012); DENNIS V.
LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY (Wiley 2006); C. E. Althaus, A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 567588 (2005).
35. A. Fiori, La medicina delle evidenze e delle scelte sta declinando verso
la Medicina dell’obbedienza giurisprudenziale?, 4 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI MEDICINA LEGALE 925-931 (2007). On this issue, see also E. J. Cassell, Consent or
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education. 36 The current situation, therefore, requires a prompt revolution of the civil liability paradigm, since past increases of liability
on doctors and hospitals in the recent past did not enhance safety
and, instead, imposed severe negative externalities on the whole
healthcare system. 37
B. A Claim in Favour of Relieving Doctors and Hospitals from Liability
The above-reported negative externalities could be reduced,
without losing the safety and efficiency of the healthcare system if
doctors and hospitals could be relieved from civil liability for damages in cases in which there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and scientifically-validated standardized
actions (guidelines, among others) are observed.
This claim is made based on the assumption (and its relevance
is limited insofar as this assumption is confirmed, which is to be
verified when drafting guidelines) that following standard actions
inspired by evidence-based medicine makes overall accidents and
damage lower than those experienced in a system in which standards
are not defined or observed. 38 In other words: even if the observance
of standards could determine unwanted damages on patients in some
cases, adherence to scientifically-validated standards should be

Obedience? Power and Authority in Medicine, 352 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 328-330
(2005).
36. W. F. Johnston, R. M. Rodriguez, D. Suarez & J. Fortman, Study of Medical Students’ Malpractice Fear and Defensive Medicine: a “Hidden Curriculum?,” 15 WEST. J. EMERGENCY MED. 293-298 (2014); K. J. O’Leary, J. Choi,
K. J. D. Watson & M. V. Williams, Medical Students’ and Residents’ Clinical
and Educational Experiences With Defensive Medicine, 87 ACADEMIC MEDICINE
142 (2012).
37. See OECD, supra note 20.
38. See, e.g., A. B. Haynes, T. G. Weiser, W. R. Berry et al., A Surgical
Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 491 (2019); P. G. Shekelle et al., Making Health Care Safer
II: An Updated Critical Analysis of the Evidence for Patient Safety Practices,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (2013), available at
https://perma.cc/7GC7-CT4Z.
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promoted in all cases in which such adherence appears, at a systemic
level, as a safer strategy than any other.
Of course, this should not prevent doctors from leaving aside
guidelines and standards when this appears appropriate in a particular case, in order to apply their professional knowledge. This approach should be an option in those specific instances in which, in
their judgment, guidelines are not suitable: professional knowledge
should not be depreciated by defensive medicine. In fact, practitioners understand and experience defensive medicine “as unnecessary
and meaningless medical actions, carried out mainly because of external demands that run counter to the GP’s professionalism.” 39 This
possibility to depart from the standard, however, would not contradict the “safe harbor” nature of adherence to the standard.
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM OF (MEDICAL) CIVIL
LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
As far as its scope is concerned, the law regulates economic and
social activities in order to contribute to the pursuit of welfare. But
the law cannot define its goals and means arbitrarily. It needs to take
into the highest consideration the functioning of economic and social contexts addressed, in order to develop well-grounded, affordable, reliable, and effective rules. 40
As noted above, the failure of the deterrence paradigm may be
observed and empirically proved. This conclusion is indisputable
when one notes that the recent increases in civil liability worsened
the position of both doctors and patients, also plaguing healthcare
systems with significant negative externalities. A radical modification is therefore required.

39. E. A. Hvidt, J. Lykkegaard, L. B. Pedersen, K. M. Pedersen, A. Munck
& M. K. Andersen, How is Defensive Medicine Understood and Experienced in
a Primary Care Setting? A Qualitative Focus Group Study Among Danish General Practitioners, 7 BMJ OPEN (2017).
40. E. R. de Jong, M. G. Faure, I. Giesen & P. Mascini, Judge-Made Risk
Regulation and Tort Law: An Introduction, 9 EUR. J. RISK RES. 6-13 (2018).
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Such a modification appears particularly important these days
because of the incentives to practice “defensive medicine.” What
may even be more relevant, however, is that the traditional paradigm
of medical civil liability is very likely to prevent the development of
markets toward intensive use of artificial intelligence and robotization, which are likely to play an increasingly more relevant role in
healthcare, especially through machine learning and deep learning
technologies.
In fact, artificial intelligence can contribute to healthcare in two
main areas. The first one relates to developing medical knowledge
and standards. This is happening through the use of sophisticated
algorithms that combine big data in order to relate a much higher
number of variables and allow drafting medical guidelines and databases that are incredibly more reliable. 41 Such a change, it ought
to be noted, will evolve sharply also due to the pursuit of open-access and open-data strategies by most legal systems, including the
EU. 42
The second one relates to the use of artificial intelligence in performing medical activities—artificial intelligence provides robots
with the ability to execute even complex interventions with an increasingly higher autonomy. 43
41. G. H. Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP JOURNAL CLUB A-16
(1991); Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A
New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420-25 (1992);
D. L. Sackett, W. M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. M. Gray, R. B. Haynes & W. S. Richardson, Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 71 BMJ 312
(1996).
42. In 2003, the European Commission set up a legal framework to allow the
reuse of public sector information through the so-called “PSI Directive” (Directive 2003/98/EC), last revised in 2013 by Directive 2013/37/EU. Open-data
policies include the EU Open Data Portal, set up in 2012, following European
Commission Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents. On
these issues, see European Commission, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Policy: Open Data, https://perma.cc/SA5Z-HKS4.
43. See, e.g., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Healthcare,
SIGMOIDAL, Dec. 21, 2017, https://perma.cc/9AAV-K7EJ; D. Hernandez, Artificial Intelligence Is Now Telling Doctors How to Treat You, WIRED, June 2, 2014,
available at https://perma.cc/3UFH-7LPA; PWC, What Doctor? Why AI and robotics will define New Health, June 2017, available at https://perma.cc
/TT7M-TFPT.
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Even if artificial intelligence can contribute to develop much
safer healthcare, its development could be hindered by the “traditional” paradigm of civil liability law. In fact, the current paradigm
allows redress to damaged patients under the rules that need to identify a “somebody” liable to pay such compensation either because
of his or her fault or by virtue of a strict liability rule. This means
that, in case of damage produced by a robot, judges and lawyers
would seek to impose civil liability either on its producer or on the
author of the computer program that makes it work—the only
“somebody” available to be held liable; the “nearest human,” as it
was noted. 44
This does not consider that artificial intelligence systems evolve
over time (and will do so even more in the near future) on the basis
of the information and feedback gathered and processed by thousands of different shared sources (the so-called “machine learning”
and “deep learning”). In fact, it may be said that robots do not only
perform activities, they also learn how to perform them over time. 45
In fact, the possibility that robots and programs “behave” far independently from instructions initially provided by programmers
and constructors is extremely probable. This possibility has led the
European Parliament to propose “creating a specific legal status for
robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots
could be established as having the status of electronic persons with
specific rights and obligations.” 46 I understand that the main reason
for this proposal is that of using legal personality as a technique to
44. K. Hao, When Algorithms Mess Up, the Nearest Human the Blame, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 28, 2019) available at https://perma.cc/WSW9-RP9Q.
45. H. SURDEN, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); S.
RUSSEL & P. NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. A MODERN APPROACH 693
(Pearson College Div. 2010).
46. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics
(2015/2103(INL)), § 31(f) (May 31, 2016). See also A. Amidei, Robotica intelligente e responsabilità: profili e prospettive evolutive del quadro normativo europeo, in INTELLIGENZA ARTIFICIALE E RESPONSABILITÀ 63 (U. Ruffolo ed., Giuffrè
2017); G. GUERRA, LA SICUREZZA DEGLI ARTEFATTI ROBOTICI IN PROSPETTIVA
COMPARATISTICA (Il Mulino 2018).
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hold the robot liable and, therefore, insulate its obligations (including redress for damage) from those of its producer and programmer.
I believe that such proposal is undesirable, since robots cannot and
should not be considered “persons” under current civil law. 47 That
approach, however, clearly shows the need to shift “obligations”
away from producers and programmers when robots are capable of
acting rather autonomously from their original design. 48
All what was noted above with reference to artificial intelligence
clearly shows that the cause-and-effect relationship as regards damage causation in this field might not be linear as we are used to believing 49 (though not everybody agrees 50) and that adoption of a
“no-fault” approach (within the meaning defined above, under §1 51)
47. The issue is very wide, and it is not possible to address it here appropriately. A discussion of the issue can be found in G. Wagner, Robot, Inc: Personhood for Autonomous Systems, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019); G. Wagner, Robot Liability (Münster Colloquium on EU Law and Digital Economy, Liability for
Robotics and the Internet of Things) (Mar. 12, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/435N-MGC7; H. Eidenmüller (2017), The Rise of Robots and the
Law of Humans, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT, 765, 771-772;
S. CHOPRA & L. F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL
AGENTS (Michigan 2011); B. J. Koops, M. Hildebrandt & D.-O. Jaquet, Bridging
the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 497 (2010); A. Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case
for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules, 5 L., INNOVATION AND TECH. 214-247; C. Boscarato, Who is Responsible for a Robot’s Action? An Initial Examination of Italian Law Within a European Perspective, in
TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS IN NEUROSCIENCES AND ROBOTICS 393 (B. van der Bergh & L. Klaming eds., Wolf Legal Publishers 2011).
48. This need appears in legal literature: for example, see M. U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and
Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 399 (2016).
49. With specific reference to artificial intelligence, see E. A. Karnov, The
Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51 (R. Calo, A.M. Froomkin & I. Kerr eds., Edward Elgar 2016); M. U.
Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353-400 (2016).
50. D. C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117 (2014); F. P. Hubbard, Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV., 1803
(2014).
51. This is with reference to a system in which redress is provided by a dedicated fund and not by a “culpable” agent and not with reference to strict liability
schemes, which also prescind from “fault” but operate in the opposite direction,
by imposing liability on the agent regardless of any culpability.
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to medical liability could prove more efficient than the current system.
There is undoubtedly no convergence on this issue and many
proposals have been made 52 in order to address artificial intelligence
devices, either fault-based rules 53 or strict-liability regimes, 54 including an extension of the rules on defective products 55 or on animals under the custody of humans. 56 However, I claim that the application of the traditional paradigm of civil liability would not foster safety even with respect to these technological issues; instead, it
would expose producers and programmers to unforeseeable and potentially unlimited claims for civil liability without any “fault” or
any disregard for a foreseeable risk being in place. This would likely
deter them from entering the market or developing it, thus hindering
technological evolution—what is sometimes called the risk of “technology chilling.” 57
52. A comparative analysis with reference to the different approaches in the
U. S., Europe, and China can be found in M. Infantino & W. Wang, Algorithmic
Torts: A Prospective Comparative Overview, 28 TRANSNATL. L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 309 (2018). An attempt at reconstructing the different strategies available
under Italian law was made by U. Ruffolo, Per I fondamenti di un diritto della
robotica self-learning; dalla machinery produttiva all’auto driverless: verso una
“responsabilità da algoritmo”?, in INTELLIGENZA ARTIFICIALE E RESPONSABILITÀ 1-30 (U. Ruffolo ed., Giuffrè 2017).
53. See, e.g., R. Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm
of Tort Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018); B. Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 108
GEO. L.J. 225 (2019).
54. In favor of a strict-liability regime, see, e.g., L. BUONANNO, CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE INFLUENCE OF BLOCKCHAIN,
BLOCKCHAIN AS THE BACKBONE OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY-BASED CIVIL LIABILITY
REGIME (European Law Institute 2019), available at https://perma.cc/G8K36SK8.
55. J. S. Borghetti, LA RESPONSABILITÉ DU FAIT DES PRODUITS : ÉTUDE DE
DROIT COMPARÉ 495 (LGDJ 2004).
56. E. Schaerer, R. Kelley & M. Nicolescu, Robots as Animals: A Framework
for Liability and Responsibility in Human-Robot Interactions 72 (paper presented
at the XVIII IEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, Toyoma, Japan) (Sept. 27, 2009), https://perma.cc/N9PY-XUYN.
57. Among others, see W. K. Viscusi & M. J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 125
(P. H. Schuck ed., W. W. Norton & Company 1991); THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (P. W. Huber & R. E.
Litan eds., Brookings Institution Press 1991); G. Parchomovsky & A. Stein, Torts
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Also, in this case it appears that the problems and disincentives
evidenced above are somehow connected to the issue of standardization and standardized action. In my opinion, the above-noted
problems and disincentives, capable of affecting the market of artificial intelligence devices, could be reduced if producers and programmers could be relieved from civil liability for damage at least
in certain cases: when there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and the robot (both in its physical components and in its artificial intelligence aspects) complied with scientifically validated production and programming standards. 58
Of course, in this case respect for standards could lead to unwanted damage to patients. However, my claim is made on the same
assumption (to be further verified in all relevant cases) that in several cases, the adoption of artificial intelligence and robots determines a relevant increase in safety within healthcare systems and
reduces the risk of injury and death when compared to healthcare
based only on human action. 59
It is undisputable that investments in research on new technologies should be fostered and supported or, at least, not discouraged:
new technologies produce a sensible increase in safety within
healthcare systems and reduce the risk of injury and death, as available data already show with respect to the current situation. 60
and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008). The problem is also discussed in
J. Morgan, Torts and Technology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION AND TECHNOLOGY 522 (R. Brownsword, E. Scotford & K. Yeung eds., Oxford U. Press 2017).
58. For the issue of technical safety standards with specific reference to robots is dealt with, among others, see G. GUERRA, LA SICUREZZA DEGLI ARTEFATTI
ROBOTICI IN PROSPETTIVA COMPARATISTICA 104 (Il Mulino 2018) and G. S. Virk,
The Role of Standardisation in the Regulation of Robotic Technologies, in LAW
AND TECHNOLOGY. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 311 (E. Palmerini & E. Stradella eds., Pisa U. Press 2013).
59. See, e.g., K. W. Kizer & L. N. Blum, Safe Practices for Better Health
Care, in IV ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM RESEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION (K. Henriksen, J.B. Battles, E.S. Marks et al. eds., Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality 2005), available at https://perma.cc/V9P5-9RHQ. So the
provision of incentives to technological innovation, provided that it respect scientifically validated standards, appears as a safer strategy than any other.
60. See id.
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This is one of the reasons why I believe that modern technology,
sometimes, requires new specific legislation instead of mere adjusting of existing laws; a “law of the horse,” as it was said 61: without
appropriate ad hoc legislation, in fact, rules developed centuries ago
in very different contexts could provide perverse incentives and produce undesirable negative externalities.
V. SHIFTING LIABILITY AWAY FROM DOCTORS, HOSPITALS, AND
PRODUCERS AND PROGRAMMERS OF AI DEVICES
As shown above, the healthcare system is affected by a set of
perverse incentives induced by the traditional paradigm of civil liability law. The problem could be reduced by shifting the liability
away from doctors, hospitals, and producers and programmers of AI
devices.
What is most important to note, however, is that such shifting
away should not reduce civil liability and the corresponding patients’ right to redress in case of damage. In fact, on the patients’
side, claims for redress based on health injury are commonly recognized, in most jurisdictions, as deriving from acknowledged constitutional rights to health. The right to health was also internationally
recognized in the Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health
Organization (1946); it was then included in art. 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and art. 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
Moreover, the “solidarity” approach that now pervades legal
systems, briefly mentioned above, 62 would not allow that damaged
61. The debate on whether modern technology requires new specific legislation or existing legislation and concepts may be adjusted to it may be dated back
to F. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEG. FORUM 207
(1996) and L. Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501. More recently, among others, see R. Calo, Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 514 (2015); E. Stradella, Approaches for
Regulating Roboting Technologies: Lessons Learned and Concluding Remarks,
in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT 345 (E. Palmerini & E. Stradella eds., Pisa U. Press 2013).
62. See supra § II. A.
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patients not be compensated for any damage incurred because of
medical therapies. Redress in favor of damaged patients may be considered, as such, a non-controversial right, which would be rather
difficult to repeal.
However, at closer sight, the redress of wrongs suffered by medical patients does not necessarily imply that the obligation to pay be
imposed on doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of
AI devices. What the solidarity approach requires, in fact, is that the
loss does not remain with the damaged patients; its imposition on
doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of AI devices,
should depend on whether it enhances or, instead, weakens safety.
VI. FROM CIVIL LIABILITY TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LOSSES
The thesis in this article is that a new legal approach should be
developed in medical civil liability law, aimed at maintaining redress for damage on the patients’ side (micro-systemic level) but
shifting the obligation to pay for such redress away from doctors and
hospitals (when there is not evidence of negligence, imprudence, or
unskillfulness and scientifically validated standards of action are
complied with). A further claim is that a similar development should
shift away that obligation also from producers and programmers of
artificial intelligence devices, when there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and scientifically validated
standards of production and programming are complied with. This
evolution would reduce incentives to practice defensive medicine,
reduce disincentives to invest in medical technology, and decrease
inefficiencies and negative externalities deriving from defensive
medicine (macro-systemic level). 63
In other words, the law of redress for medical damage should
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management
of losses, which would take into a much higher account the
63. Such evolution toward a “no-fault” system was also supported in OECD,
supra note 20, at 62 et seq., however without deepening the issue as to how it
could be pursued.
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“systemic” need of appropriate functioning of complex institutions
and markets such as modern healthcare systems. One may note that
this evolution could appropriately be carried out at the European
level, even if the matter is rather controversial and excessively cumbersome to be discussed in this article. 64
In fact, what appears to favor a single patient in the short run
(e.g., sentencing a doctor to compensate the damage suffered by the
patient after a very complex surgical intervention, whether or not
evidence of fault is adduced) may eventually damage all future patients if it prevents the whole healthcare system from functioning
appropriately and developing into a more technological, evidencebased, and safer system (because of the incentives and disincentives
brought about by the sentencing itself; in the example: doctors
would refuse future complex surgical interventions).
The possibility of balancing these two apparently conflicting
goals is not unknown to some legal systems. “No-fault” legislation
on redress following medical damage (within the meaning of “nofault” adopted here, which makes reference to a system where redress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the
agent being established and not based on strict-liability schemes 65)
may be found in some jurisdictions like New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. 66
A detailed exam of such models would fall beyond the scope of
this article. However, it may be noteworthy to highlight that “nofault” schemes appear to differ, at a very broad view, with respect
to five main variables: the extent of eligibility criteria for compensation (which may be limited to specified damage, as it happens in
Virginia and Florida with respect to birth-related neurological
64. See, e.g., F. Toriello, La responsabilità medica in prospettiva (incerta) di
armonizzazione europea, 2 RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 291 (2017); G. Wagner, The
Project of Harmonizing European Tort Law, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2005 670
(H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2006); H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
686 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015).
65. See supra § I.
66. See OECD, supra note 20, for a presentation on these systems.
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injury, 67 or apply to all “treatment injuries,” as in New Zealand after
reform in 2005 68); whether the scheme prevents continued access to
courts or not; how these schemes are funded (mainly: privately, publicly, or through a mixed scheme 69); whether redress is imposed a
financial cap or not; definition of the financial entitlement (only economic or also non-economic damages). 70 It is not clear whether such
pieces of legislation are simply capable of being “transplanted” into
different legal systems and of reducing (if not resolving) the problem of defensive medicine. Several issues need be taken into account in this respect.
First, such foreign “no-fault systems” are not targeted at the
problem of standardization and are mainly conditioned upon the
damaged patient waiving civil litigation, instead. Therefore, they
have a narrower scope with respect to the issue of enhancing standardization in view of a safer system. I propose, instead, that, as far
as healthcare is concerned, legal systems should tolerate that the application of scientifically validated standards could determine harmful consequences in individual cases insofar as, under a systemic

67. In regard to Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 et seq., known as
the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act. Further information may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/9AE9-SNME.
With respect to Florida, see FLA. STAT. §§ 766-301 et seq. Further information
may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/5S2F-KYZ5.
68. In fact, reforms in 2005 removed the final “fault” element still present in
the system and designed it as a true “no-fault” scheme, see M. Bismark & R. Paterson, No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1.
69. In regard to financing, there are several models available, ranging from
systems financed through contributions made by healthcare providers to systems
funded via tax revenues. See OECD, supra note 20, for a comparative analysis on
this issue; M.M. Mello, A. Kachalia & D.M. Studdert, Administrative Compensation for Medical Injuries: Lessons from Three Foreign Systems (2011), available
at https://perma.cc/F9LQ-AMUS; K. DICKSON, K. HINDS, H. BURCHETT, G.
BRUNTON, C. STANSFIELD & J. THOMAS, NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SCHEMES: A
RAPID REALIST REVIEW (UCL Institute of Education 2016); T. Vandersteegen,
W. Marneffe, I. Cleemput & L. Vereeck, The Impact of No-Fault Compensation
on Health Care Expenditures: An Empirical Study of OECD Countries, 119
HEALTH POLICY 367 (2015).
70. These variables are compared among different “no-fault” compensation
schemes in DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69.
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point of view, such application allows a significant reduction of the
overall risks and damages. 71
Even if this idea is somehow disruptive and would influence the
way this issue is understood, also under an ethical point of view, its
feasibility may be found in some small and limited pieces of legislation (without any possibility of extensive application by way of
interpretation) that provide similar mechanisms of compensation in
standardized medical activities bearing some statistical risks but
much more beneficial effects: it is the case, for example, of compensation following adverse effects attributed to vaccination, whose adverse effects are very rare in comparison with the more than 2.5 million deaths prevented only in 2008 by vaccination. 72 The issue resembles, under this point of view, that of mandatory seat belt in
71. In other and more detailed words, under the proposal made in this article,
redress of (statistically) “inevitable” damages resulting from compliance with scientifically-validated standards, within sectors characterized by high risk and high
scientific or technological content, should not be imposed on persons performing
the relevant activities or supplying products to the market as long as there is no
evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and given criteria, to be
developed within an agreed framework, are complied with (e.g., treatment is appropriate, guidelines complied with scientific validation principles and were applied appropriately, etc.).
72. A review of World Health Organization Member States based on 2018
data showed that no-fault compensation systems for vaccine injuries have been
developed in a few high-income countries for more than 50 years, mostly at the
central or federal government level, and are government-funded. Claimants are
compensated with either: lump-sums; amounts calculated based on medical care
costs and expenses, loss of earnings or earning capacity; or monetary compensation calculated based on pain and suffering, emotional distress, permanent impairment or loss of function; or combination of those. It is noteworthy that, in most
jurisdictions, vaccine injury claimants have the right to seek damages either
through civil litigation or from a compensation scheme, but not both simultaneously: see R. G. Mungwira, Ch. Guillard, A. Saldaña, N. Okabe, H. Petousis-Harris, E. Agbenu, L. Rodewald & P.L.F. Zuber, Global Landscape Analysis of NoFault Compensation Programmes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of
Implementing Countries, 15 PLoS ONE (2020). On this issue, see also WHO,
STATE OF THE WORLD’S VACCINES AND IMMUNIZATION (3d ed., 2009), available
at https://perma.cc/DAK5-34BX; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-fault compensation
following adverse events attributed to vaccination: a review of international programmes, BULLETIN OF THE WHO (2011), available at https://perma.cc/4KVD79XB; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse Events
Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, 89 BULLETIN
OF THE WHO 371; S. F. HALABI & S. B. OMER, A Global Vaccine Injury Compensation System, 317 JAMA 471 (2017).
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motor vehicles: as it was noted, “seat belts can cause injuries but it
is vastly more likely that they will protect you. It is all about probabilities and the chances are on the side of wearing seat belts.” 73
Second, foreign “no-fault” systems recalled above are rather different and their features depend upon the different jurisdictions they
belong to. As noted above, within the existing “no-fault” schemes
there is no uniformity as to the extent of eligibility criteria for compensation; whether the scheme should prevent continued access to
courts or not; how these schemes are to be funded (the option being
via tax revenues, privately, or via a mixed solution); whether a financial cap should be imposed on redress; 74 whether the financial
entitlement should limit to economic damage or include also noneconomic damage. Moreover, in some cases they apply rather automatically upon the occurrence of the event (as it happens in Florida
and Virginia if proof is given that the neurological birth injury occurred as a result of the birth process) while in others an avoidability
standard is adopted (as in European Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, where it is verified whether injuries could have been avoided if the care provided had been of optimal quality). 75 Finally, the effect for the community depends on
the legal and institutional context the scheme operates in, in particular with reference to the way the social security net is designed in
each different country. 76
Therefore, it appears difficult to transplant any given scheme
into a different jurisdiction without adaptation. I believe that there
is much room for future research in order to classify the most relevant variables, within legal systems, capable of influencing the way
“no-fault” schemes (with the usual warning on the meaning of this
concept adopted here 77) may operate and define how such schemes
73. A. Giubilini & J. Savulescu, Vaccination, Risks, and Freedom: The Seat
Belt Analogy, 12 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 237 (2019).
74. See, supra note 69, and the text this footnote refers to.
75. On this issue, see DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 9.
76. Id. at 4.
77. See supra § I.
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need be adjusted in order to adapt to the different legal systems they
are implemented into.
Third, the legal transplant of any of such foreign “no-fault systems” may not reduce, in itself, excessive litigation (and, therefore,
“defensive medicine”). As it was noted, the rather positive outcome
experienced in New Zealand seems to depend on “the absence of a
culture of suing in New Zealand” that pre-existed in the country, 78
which makes it unreliable that introduction of similar legislation
could lead to similar results in jurisdiction where civil litigation is
much higher and showed increase in the last decades. 79 It is necessary, therefore, to take into account cultural differences between
countries and assess how much they may influence the outcome of
the proposed reform.
Fourth, foreign “no-fault systems” are currently showing deficiencies as regards incentives to safety, in the absence of the deterrence brought about by civil liability 80: in fact, pure “no-fault” models (within the meaning referred to here) raise concerns as to their
appropriateness to limit the risk of moral hazard, exactly as it happens in New Zealand, since “the principal weakness of no-fault
schemes is the difficulty of ensuring that the socially optimal
amount of care is taken by potential loss-causers, as the links between their potential to cause loss and the costs of their actions are
severed.” 81 In this sense, I claim that “no-fault” schemes, within the
meaning proposed here, should not apply out of the scope briefly
mentioned here (i.e., compliance with scientifically validated
78. K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, no Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury and Healthcare Ethics and Practice, 67 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACTICE 3839 (2017).
79. OECD, supra note 20, at 16 et seq.
80. In general, on this point, see also DICKSON ET AL, supra note 69, at 5; K.
Wallis, New Zealand’s 2005 ‘No-Fault’ Compensation Reforms and Medical Professional Accountability for Harm, 126 NEW ZEALAND MED. J. 33 (2013). Of
course, such a point is raised with particular emphasis by those who believe that
deterrence should be considered as an indispensable effect of legislation on redress; see, e.g., A. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181.
81. B. Howell, J. Kavanagh & L. Marriott, No-Fault Public Liability Insurance: Evidence from New Zealand, 9 AGENDA 137 (2002).
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standards where there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or
unskillfulness); otherwise the system would lose the deterrence factor that civil liability may still offer (e.g., providing application of
“fault” rules in case of negligence).
Moreover, such “no-fault” schemes should be combined with
“fault” rules in order to take advantage of the benefits brought by
each of them, narrowing their flaws by their reciprocal interplay. In
any case, where these schemes apply, they should be matched with
a set of rules capable of providing incentives for safety. I believe
that, in those cases where no one can be blamed for ignoring the
standards established, such set of rules should be uncoupled from
deterrence on individuals (e.g., deterrence induced by civil liability
should not be replaced with deterrence induced by disciplinary sanctions, as it happened in New Zealand) and should rather be inspired
by organizational and procedural criteria, thus shifting paradigmatic
centrality from individuals to systemic risk management. 82
Of course, such an evolution would need to be accompanied by
a cultural shift aimed at abandoning the desire for revenge often felt
by damaged patients and their families and at rediscovering the importance of a constructive relationship between doctors and patients.
This issue falls outside the scope of this article and, regretfully,
82. Such a shift would be particularly relevant if one considers that many (if
not most of the) medical injuries relate to unavoidable human error in a context of
system failure: see TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (L.
T., Kohn, J.M. Corrigan & M.S. Donaldson eds., National Academies Press
2000); K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation of Compensation Mechanisms in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1
(2018). New Zealand is a relevant example in this respect. Before 2005, in New
Zealand compensation was granted upon evidence of medical error. Since all findings of error were reported to the Medical Council, “compensation could bring
disciplinary repercussions for doctors,” which discouraged doctors and sometimes even patients from participating in the compensation claims process. This
knot was untied in 2005, when eligibility was extended to all injuries caused by
treatment and the prior reporting duties were replaced by a new duty to report
“risk of harm to the public” to the “authorities responsible for patient safety,”
which reduced doctors’ fear and improved information flows within the system:
see K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, No Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Medical
Injury and Healthcare Ethics and Practice, 67 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACTICE 38
(2017).
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cannot be dealt with here. It is relevant to note, even only incidentally, that such a shift would require a more appropriate and effective attitude to dialogue in healthcare, 83 in particular as regards
acquisition of the informed consent. 84
Finally, foreign “no-fault systems” are designed, interpreted,
and applied as “exceptions” to “common” civil liability systems,
which are considered applicable by default. On the other hand, I believe that no-fault redress schemes (following the lexical convention
proposed in this research) should rise, in relevant sectors and with
reference to relevant cases, to the role of an independent and alternative system of redress on an equal footing to “fault” civil liability—a sort of “double track” legislation on redress for damage.
Of course, the adoption of such a redress system for medical injuries, targeted at the need to foster standardization of medical treatments, would require the definition of many different variables—
which may only be briefly referred to here. First, it is based on the
objective definition of certain standards as “scientifically validated,”
also requiring an appropriate validation system. A third, independent party, must be in charge of assessing redress to damaged patients
in application of the scheme, and care must be taken of its functioning and funding. It will also be needed to define standardized
amounts of compensation. This is a critical issue under a systemic
point of view, and the acceptance of such standardized compensation may strongly depend upon the way the social security net is
designed in each different country. 85 On all these issues, it seems
83. As it was noted, “the doctor-patient relationship is shaped by the quality
and manner of information exchange”: see K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation of Compensation Mechanisms
in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1.
84. On this issue, see, e.g., R. R. FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (Oxford U. Press 1986); L. Asveld, Informed Consent in Fields of Medical and Technological Practice: An Explorative
Comparison, 10 TECHNÉ: RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 18
(2006).
85. It is acknowledged that “no-fault” schemes are likely to lead to lower
compensation in favor of damaged patients. There appears to be evidence to suggest that “no-fault” schemes providing standardized compensation are more easily
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possible to draw inspiration, at least in part, from jurisdictions such
as Sweden and New Zealand. 86

accepted in countries such as New Zealand and Scandinavia, where healthcare is
understood as an important provision by central government and other forms of
social insurance exist. On the other hand, countries with less of a social security
safety net to support individuals with ongoing health and disability issues, such
as the U.S., are understandably more reluctant to deny claimants the possibility of
attaining damages through the court process: see DICKSON ET AL.,supra note 69,
at 4, 54.
86. A. Antoci, A. Fiori Maccioni & P. Russu, The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation, 11 PLOS ONE (2016); P. C. Weiler, The Case
for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993); A. Towse & P.
Danzon, Medical Negligence and the NHS: An Economic Analysis, 8 HEALTH
ECON. 93. See OECD, supra note 20, at 13 et seq., which also mentions the cases
of Denmark and Finland.

